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ABSTRACT
We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-
cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular,
we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approaches—
that in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces)
direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any predic-
tion at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always gen-
erate prediction—is indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we
argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension
between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal
democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of
the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor
non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all
three desiderata.
1. INTRODUCTION
Positive political theory is concerned with understanding political phenomena
through the use of analytical models which, it is hoped, lend insight into why
outcomes look the way they do and not some other way. Examples of such
259
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phenomena include which parties or candidates are elected at certain times,
which bills are adopted by legislative bodies, and when and how wars are
fought between countries. Most of the models begin with the presumption
that these phenomena result from decisions made by the relevant individuals,
be they voters and candidates in the first example, elected representatives and
appointed ministers in the second, or heads of state in the third. Furthermore,
these decisions are to a large extent a consequence of the preferences, beliefs,
and actions of these individuals.
Most models within positive theory are members of one of two families,
although the demarcation line between the two is at times obscure; indeed,
one of the goals of this chapter is to provide our perspective on how these two
families fit together and to argue that, at times, this line should be obscure. One
class of models is motivated by the canonic rational choice theory of individual
decision making. (We confine attention here to formal models built around
rational choice theory. Although by no means the only possible or extant sort
of formal model for studying politics, rational choice models are far and away
the modal sort.) In its simplest form, this theory assumes an individual has well-
defined preferences over a given set of alternatives and chooses any alternative
with the property that no other alternative in the set is strictly more preferred
by her; that is, the individual chooses a “best” alternative. In politics, however,
it is rarely the case that only one individual’s preferences are relevant for any
collective choice; even dictators are sensitive to at least some others in the
polity. Consequently, the first family of models in positive political theory,
which we associate with the methods of social choice, examines the possibility
that individual preferences are directly aggregated into a collective, or social,
preference relation which, as in the theory of individual decision making, is
then maximized to yield a set of best alternatives (where “best” is defined as
being most preferred with respect to the collective preference relation). If a
set of best alternatives for a given method of aggregation necessarily exists,
then we have an internally consistent model of observed collective choices as
elements from this set analogous to the model of individual choice, and it is in
principle possible to ascertain whether the model does or does not provide a
good explanation for what is observed in the real world of politics.
One missing piece of the direct aggregation story is the appropriate method
by which the aggregation of individuals’ preferences into social preference is
made, for example majority rule, unanimity, or dictatorship. Although this is
typically dictated by explicit, inherent features of the political phenomenon in
question (e.g. plurality-rule elections), there are occasionally more amorphous
situations in which the choice might best be considered in terms of a class of
rules, all of which satisfy some critical properties of the situation (e.g. although
the specific rules governing within-committee decisions may be more or less
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fluid, it is reasonable to suppose they all satisfy some notion of monotonicity
in that more support for an alternative improves that alternative’s chances of
selection). The key here is to think of the aggregation rule as a particular feature
of the model itself, appropriately left to the analyst to decide depending on what
she is attempting to explain. But whatever rule is appropriate for any given
model, the model itself is well specified as an explanatory model of political
outcomes only to the extent that the rule yields best alternatives. Thus, for the
direct preference aggregation approach to work as a general theory of politics,
we need to determine the extent to which different aggregation methods insure
the existence of best alternatives.
It is important to emphasize that the direct aggregation of individual prefer-
ences is not in general equivalent to indirect aggregation of preferences through
the aggregation of individual actions. For example, an individual may have
well-defined preferences over a set of candidates but choose to abstain in an
election, or to vote strategically. Consequently, there is no a priori reason to
suppose that elections lead to the same outcome that would occur if aggregation
were directly over given preferences rather than indirectly over recorded votes.
Of course, we expect the actions of purposive individuals to be intimately con-
nected to their respective preferences, and such connections are the subject of
the second principal family of models within positive political theory.
In this second family of models, individuals are no longer passive partici-
pants in the collective decision making, but rather make individual choices of
behavior that then jointly determine the collective choice of outcome. These
models then naturally fall into the methodology of game theory. Here the fun-
damental moving parts of the model include the set of possible behaviors or
strategies available to each of the participants, as well as a description of how
any list of strategies relates to the set of outcomes. As with the preference
aggregation rules in the first family of models, the analyst’s choice of the ap-
propriate moving parts may be influenced by explicit features of the political
phenomenon in question. Examples of such features are the closed rule in par-
liamentary decision making; presidential veto power; floor-recognition rules in
legislative debate and agenda setting; germaneness rules for amendments; and
party primaries for selecting electoral candidates. At other times, in contrast,
there may not exist such explicit features to provide a roadmap to the “correct”
model. Perhaps the quintessential example is the modeling of any bargaining
process for, say, within-committee or within-party decision making; the analyst
must decide who has the right to make what proposals and when, how to treat
nonbinding communication or the possibility of renegotiation, etc. And the
extent to which one model is “better than” another here depends in part on the
empirical evaluation of their various predictions, the relative degree to which
they generate insights into the workings of the institution, and so on.
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Unlike direct preference aggregation models, the game theory models do not
presume that collective outcomes are best elements relative to some underlying
social preference relation. Rather, they are the consequences of a set of mutually
consistent individual decisions within a given game. It is thus the composition
of preferences and game structure that explains collective choices in this family
of models and not, as in the first family, the application of an aggregation rule
to preferences per se. A simple example illustrates the two classes of models.
Three individuals, 1, 2, and 3, must come to some collective choice from a
set of three mutually exclusive alternatives, x, y, and z. Let z be a given status
quo policy and assume x and y are the only feasible alternatives to z. Individual
1 is assumed to prefer x most, followed by y, and finally to consider z the worst
option; individual 2 strictly prefers z to x, and strictly prefers x to y; individual 3
prefers alternative y most, ranks x next best, and considers z the worst outcome.
Then under simple majority rule, a direct preference aggregation model predicts
a collective choice of x (since x is pairwise majority-preferred to both y and z),
and the explanation for such a prediction is that x is uniquely best relative to
the underlying aggregation rule.
Now suppose that instead of direct preference aggregation by majority rule,
the choice of an alternative from the list x, y, and z is determined according
to the following game form or set of rules. Individual 3 has the sole right to
propose a take-it-or-leave-it change in policy away from the status quo, z. So
individual 3 can either make no proposal, in which case z remains the collective
choice, or can propose alternative x or y as the new policy; if individual 3
does offer a proposal, then the collective decision is reached via majority vote
between z and the proposal. Under this institutional arrangement, it is clear
that individual 3 offers alternative y, y defeats z, and y becomes the collective
choice. Thus, in this example, the institutionally explicit model of indirect
preference aggregation offers a distinct prediction of a collective choice, y,
and this is supported by reference not only to individuals’ preferences and the
aggregation rule, but also to the institutional rules governing the choice process
and the particular choices individuals make.
Prima facie, it seems reasonable to infer that results from the direct collective
preference models have little, if any, relevance to those from the indirect game
theory models. We consider such an inference inappropriate. In particular, we
argue that the choice between collective-preference and game-theoretic models
cannot be predicated on a claim that the former typically fail to predict any
choice whereas the latter almost always do yield a prediction. Indeed, such a
claim is true only to the extent that game-theoretic, in contrast to collective-
preference, models do not insist that all collective choices satisfy a certain
normative requirement. First, however, we review in more detail the structure
of the two families of models. The aim is not to provide a comprehensive
survey of positive political theory. Instead, we offer a (probably idiosyncratic)
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perspective on what goes into a formal model and how the two methodological
approaches within positive political theory hang together. Our arguments are
illustrated by four examples from the literature on legislative behavior.
2. THE BASIC ENVIRONMENT
The primitives of any rational choice–theoretic formal model of politics include
a specification of a set of the relevant individuals, denoted N; a set of feasible
alternatives or outcomes, X; and, for each individual in N, a description of her
preferences over the set X. Examples of N are the members of a congressional
district, of an interest group, of a parliamentary committee, or of a jury. Cor-
responding examples of the alternatives from which such groups are to choose
are, respectively, candidates for legislative office, alternative policies to the sta-
tus quo, or the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Although many of the results
below have analogs when the set of feasible alternatives is finite, for pedagogic
reasons we concentrate on the spatial model, in which the set X of feasible
alternatives constitutes a nicely shaped geometric object in that it is a closed,
bounded, and convex subset of d-dimensional Euclidean space. Thus X could
be the unit square, with an element of X then describing two numbers between
zero and one (for instance, two tax rates); or X could be the two-dimensional
unit simplex, with an element in X describing how one dollar is to be divided
among three groups. (Although there are three groups, the feasible set of alter-
natives is two-dimensional, since the three numbers have to add up to one; thus
any two amounts completely determine the third.) In general we will interpret
the parameter d, the number of issues to be resolved, as a crude measure of
the complexity of the collective-decision problem at hand, in that for example
single-issue decision problems are in a sense easier to solve than are multi-issue
decision problems.
We observe particular policies or outcomes being selected at different points
in time and by different polities, as well as a variety of contemporaneous and
exogenously given parameters (more on the latter below). As described in
Section 1, one of the goals of positive political theory is to explain these ob-
served policy choices as functions of the observed parameters. A maintained hy-
pothesis in most positive theory models is that these observed collective choices
somehow reflect the underlying preferences (tastes, values, opinions, etc) of
some or all of the individuals in the relevant group. To formalize the idea of
individual preferences, each individual in N is assumed to possess a binary pref-
erence relation on X, denoted Ri, where, for any two alternatives x and y, “x Ri y”
is shorthand for the statement “according to individual i, x is at least as good as
y.” From Ri one can define i’s strict preference relation, Pi (where “x Pi y” reads
“according to individual i, x is strictly better than y”) and i’s indifference relation,
Ii (where “x Ii y” reads “according to individual i, x and y are equally good”).
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For any given group of individuals N D f1; : : : ; ng, the list of all individuals’
preferences is described by a preference profile, denoted R D .R1; : : : ; Rn/.
Various restrictions are placed on individual preferences to keep the mod-
els relatively tractable. The most basic of these are imposed to guarantee that
individual-level decision problems are well defined; these restrictions then im-
ply that any subsequent negative results concerning collective “rationality” are
not due to any individual-level irrationality, but are rather the consequence of
the interaction between individuals with disparate preferences, as summarized
by the profile R. Typical assumptions for the spatial model are given by the
“four Cs,” namely, that individual preferences are complete (for all x,y in X
either x Ri y or y Ri x , or both); consistent, e.g. transitive preferences (if both
x Ri y and y Ri z then x Ri z); continuous (if x Pi y then for any alternative z suffi-
ciently close to y and alternative w sufficiently close to x, wPi z); and (strictly)
convex (if x Ri y then for any distinct alternative z lying on the straight line
between x and y, z Pi y). Together these four assumptions imply that for each
individual, the set of preference-maximizing alternatives or ideal points, m.Ri /,
is necessarily nonempty and single-valued, and that preferences decline as out-
comes move away from this ideal point in any direction.1 In the special case
where the outcome space X is one-dimensional, such preferences are known as
single-peaked. Let R denote the set of preference profiles R D .R1; : : : ; Rn/
such that each Ri satisfies the above four assumptions.
3. SOCIAL CHOICE
Suppose we hypothesize that the observed collective choices are in fact the
best alternatives from, say, individual 1’s perspective. We could then develop
a model of how various parameters, for example 1’s income or socioeconomic
background, influence her preferences and hence her best alternative in any set
of choices, and subsequently test the model using the observables (i.e. realized
choices and given parameter values). The basic premise in most positive po-
litical theory models, however, is that more than one individual’s preferences
matter. Consequently, even if we have a firm grasp of how individual prefer-
ences depend on some list of exogenous parameters, we still need a theory of
how the possibly different and conflicting preferences of individuals get trans-
lated into policy choices. Any such theory can be represented as a mapping
from the set of preference profiles R into the set of outcomes X. Let c denote
a generic theory of this sort, and refer to the mapping c as a social choice
1These assumptions are useful for keeping various models comparable. Strictly speaking,
however, they are stronger than necessary for some of the results below and a little weaker than
necessary for others. Also, the assumptions are emphatically not the same as assuming “Euclidean”
preferences, where outcomes equidistant from i’s ideal point are judged to be indifferent by i.
Euclidean preferences are a (relatively small) subset of those allowed for here.
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correspondence; thus c.R/ µ X denotes the outcomes selected by the collective
N when the preference profile is R, where in general we allow c.R/ to be empty
(that is, the theory does not make a prediction at R).
The difficulties in aggregating heterogeneous preferences have been known
at least since Condorcet (1785), who formulated the following famous para-
dox associated with majority rule: Let there be exactly three individuals, N D
f1, 2, 3g, and suppose their respective preferences are given by the profile
R– D
8<: x P1 y P1zy P2z P2xI
z P3x P3 y:
Here each alternative has a majority that prefers some other alternative, thereby
causing a fundamental problem for the method of majority decision. More
generally, the problem inherent in this profile is that each alternative has, by
symmetry of the preference profile, an identical claim on being the chosen
outcome. Equivalently, we could say that none of the alternatives has such a
claim, because for each there exists another that is preferred by all but one of
the individuals. Therefore modeling how the collective decides in this case
requires more structure than simply an assumption of aggregation by majority
preference.
Say that a preference profile R exhibits the Condorcet problem if for every
x in X, there exists another alternative y in X such that the number of individ-
uals strictly preferring y to x is at least n ¡ 1. Thus, when a profile exhibits
the Condorcet problem, no one alternative stands apart as a natural selection,
because for every alternative one can find another that is preferred by all but
at most one individual. Our first result shows that the existence and preva-
lence of such profiles depends on the complexity of the decision problem at
hand.
(a) If d ‚ n ¡ 1 then there exists a preference profile in R that exhibits
the Condorcet problem. (b) If d ‚ 3.n¡ 3/=2 then almost all preference
profiles inR exhibit the Condorcet problem.2 (Theorem 1)
2These results are simply restatements of the nonexistence results for q-rules, whereby x is
ranked better than y if and only if at least q individuals strictly prefer x to y (with n ‚ q > n=2),
when q D n ¡ 1. Part (a) follows from Greenberg (1979) and part (b) follows from Banks (1995)
and Saari (1997). Strictly speaking, (b) requires an additional technical assumption that individual
preferences be representable by continuously differentiable utility functions, and that n ‚ 5. A
version of (b) holds for n equal to 3 or 4 as well, but the precise statement is a little more involved
due to some special cases and, in the interest of continuity, we omit it here; see Saari (1997) for
details. Finally, while the qualifier “almost all” has a precise mathematical meaning, the caveat
can be interpreted here as “except in some extremely unlikely circumstances.”
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Therefore the only way to avoid such unpleasant profiles is to assume a
simple enough decision problem, or else assume them away directly by posit-
ing a tighter restriction on individual preferences. Alternatively, for complex
environments with unrestricted preferences any social choice correspondence
must necessarily come to grips with the question of how collectives decide
on outcomes when the preferences of the individuals exhibit a high degree of
heterogeneity.
Theorem 1 has an immediate implication for social choice correspondences
once we identify a suitable analog to the Condorcet problem. Say that the
correspondence c satisfies minimal democracy at the profile R if it is the case
that x is not in c.R/ whenever there exists an alternative y such that all but at
most one individual prefers y to x.3
(a) If d ‚ n¡1 then there exists a preference profile R such that either c(R)
is empty or else c does not satisfy minimal democracy at R. (b) If d ‚
3.n¡3/=2 then for almost all preference profiles R either c(R) is empty or c
does not satisfy minimal democracy at R. (Theorem 10)
Thus there exists a fundamental tension in preference-based theories of col-
lective decision making, in that either existence of solutions or the notion of
minimal democracy must be sacrificed at some, and at times most, preference
profiles. We shall see below that the principle “negative” result of the collec-
tive preference approach can be viewed as sacrificing existence in the name of
minimal democracy, whereas the principle “positive” result of the game theory
approach sacrifices minimal democracy in the name of existence. A distin-
guishing feature of the two approaches therefore is the trade-off they make
between these two concepts.
4. COLLECTIVE PREFERENCE
The collective preference approach to politics seeks to understand the properties
of various methods for taking preference profiles into some collective or social
preference relation; such methods we term preference aggregation rules. As the
basis for a positive model of political phenomena, the premise would then be
that, analogous to models of individual decision making, the observed outcomes
3This definition derives from Ferejohn et al (1982). It is worth pointing out that “minimally
democratic” rules as defined here (such as majority rule) may not be very palatable in other respects.
For instance, a minimally democratic rule might endorse a transfer of all individual 1’s possessions
away from 1 to everyone else in society if all individuals other than individual 1 strictly prefer
such a reallocation to leaving 1 alone. See Sen (1970) and the subsequent literature on the “liberal
paradox” for discussion of how collective decision making and individual rights can conflict.
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of the collective decision making are those that are judged to be optimal from
the prespective of this social preference relation. If such optimal outcomes
necessarily or frequently exist for different aggregation rules, it would then
be an empirical question for the positive models as to which is the “right”
rule for a given circumstance (and a philosophical question for the normative
models).
Formally, a preference aggregation rule, denoted f, specifies for every pro-
file R in the set of admissible profiles R a social preference relation Rs (with
strict aspect Ps and indifferent aspect Is), where, analogous to the interpreta-
tion of individual preference relations, the statement “x Rs y” is read “based on
the individual preferences R, and the method of aggregating them into a social
preference relation f; x is judged to be at least as good as y” (for notational
simplicity we keep the dependence of Rs on R and f implicit). Thus a prefer-
ence aggregation rule generates from the individuals’ preferences a social or
collective preference relation according to some procedure or rule, and so we
can think of an aggregation rule f as a mapping from the set R of admissible
preference profiles on X into the set, call it B, of complete binary relations on X.
(Despite the language, however, there is no sense in which it is presumed that
societies per se have “preferences” in the same way as individuals; social “pref-
erences” depend not only on the given list of individual preferences, but also
on the aggregation rule in use.) Common examples of preference aggregation
rules include (a) majority rule: x Ps y if and only if the number of individuals
strictly preferring x to y is more than half the population, (b) unanimity: x Ps y
if and only if every individual strictly prefers x to y, and (c) dictatorship: there
is some specific individual in N, say individual i, such that if i strictly prefers x
to y then x Ps y.
Consistent with the theory of individual choice, models of direct preference
aggregation posit that the alternatives selected from X are those that are best or
maximal with respect to the underlying (social) preference relation; as above,
we let m.b/ denote the set of maximal elements with respect to an arbitrary
element of the set B. Thus the mapping f takes preference profiles as input and
generates elements in the set of binary relations, B, while the mapping m takes
binary relations as input and generates elements in the set of outcomes X; see
Diagram 1:
R f¡! B m¡! X: (Diagram 1)
[Note that, unlike individual preferences, we have not imposed any struc-
ture to guarantee m.b/ is a singleton]. Composing the mappings f and m,
we label the set of best elements given a profile R and an aggregation rule
f as the core of f under R. Predictions from a direct preference aggregation
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model are thus core alternatives, and we can think of the core as itself defining
a social choice correspondence, i.e. a mapping from preference profiles into
outcomes.
A natural question then is, when is the core of an aggregation rule f guaran-
teed to be nonempty? That is, when are there best elements in X as judged by the
social preference relation derived from R via f ? From the Condorcet example
above we know that this question is nontrivial when X is finite, since there the
majority rule core is seen to be empty. Hence in this instance one cannot in
principle describe any choice from this set as the best alternative according to
majority rule.
Two additional features of the Condorcet example deserve emphasis at this
point. The first is that for other preference profiles the majority rule core
is nonempty, as for instance when all individuals have the same preferences.
Thus the nonexistence of a majority rule core requires a sufficient amount
of preference heterogeneity, as exemplified in the profile R– above. For a
wide class of preference aggregation rules we can identify precisely when such
heterogeneity exists and hence when core alternatives do or do not exist. Further,
this characterization depends, as in Theorem 1 above, on the complexity of the
decision problem at hand. Say that an aggregation rule f satisfies monotonicity
if it is true that for any x,y in X, if x is socially preferred to y at the profile R
and the profile R0 is such that x does not fall relative to y in any individual’s
ordering, then x remains socially preferred to y at the profile R0; and that f
satisfies neutrality if the rule is symmetric with respect to alternatives (i.e. the
names of the alternatives are immaterial); see Sen (1970) for formal definitions.
Then we have the following:4
For any neutral and monotonic aggregation rule f there exists a number
d. f / ‚ 1 such that if d • d. f / then the core of f is nonempty for all R
inR. (Theorem 2)
In particular, when the outcome space is one-dimensional any neutral and
monotonic aggregation rule, including majority rule, will have a nonempty
core. [Technically, this implies that there is insufficient preference hetero-
geneity in one dimension to construct a cycle as in the Condorcet exam-
ple, whereas in two or more dimensions there does exist such heterogeneity
(Schofield 1983).] Additionally, from Black (1958) we know that when n is
odd the majority rule core point is unique and possesses the well-known “me-
dian voter” characterization: If we align the individuals’ ideal points along
the one dimension from left to right, then the (unique) core alternative is
4See Greenberg (1979), Strnad (1985), and Schofield (1984). Austen-Smith & Banks (1998)
offer a self-contained development of the theory.
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simply the ideal point of an individual, say k, at which k and all those with
ideal points at or to the left of k’s ideal point constitute a majority, and k
and all those with ideal points at or to the right of k’s ideal point constitute a
majority.
Thus settings in which an assumption of a unidimensional outcome space can
be justified are readily amenable to empirical analysis under majority rule in that
we have all we could hope for: existence, uniqueness, and a straightforward
characterization. Romer & Rosenthal (1979) provide an excellent review of
much of the empirical work based on the median voter theorem up to 1979,
and they argue that the results are equivocal with respect to whether it is indeed
the median voter’s preferences that determine political decisions. For a more
positive assessment of the theorem’s predictive value, see Bueno de Mesquita
& Stokman (1994).
Alternatively, often a theoretical model will presume a unidimensional out-
come space to justify use of Black’s theorem and thereby conveniently sum-
marize a particular collective choice process that is but a part of the larger
theoretical enterprise (see below).
On the other hand, we know from the logic of Condorcet’s example that the
majority rule core will be empty whenever the preference profile R exhibits the
Condorcet problem, and from Theorem 1 such profiles necessarily exist when
the decision problem is sufficiently complex. In this sense, then, majority
rule cannot provide a general theory of social decision making. Furthermore,
Theorem 10 suggests that any such general theory under the collective preference
approach, i.e. any aggregation rule which has a nonempty core for all R in R
and for any d, must come at a price. This is shown by the second important
feature of the Condorcet example, which is that for certain aggregation methods
core points exist even with the preference profile R–. For example, if we use the
dictatorship rule and simply take the social preference relation to be the same as
(say) individual 1’s preference relation, then (since 1’s most preferred alternative
is x) there will necessarily be a core. Alternatively, under the unanimity method
each alternative is judged to be indifferent to every other, and so all three
alternatives are in the core (note that the latter prediction is useless from an
empirical perspective).
Both of these aggregation rules generate core correspondences that, when
viewed as social choice correspondences, fail to satisfy minimal democracy. In
fact, any aggregation rule for which existence is guaranteed invariably involves
some combination of normatively unappealing (as in the case of dictatorship)
and empirically unappealing (as in the case of unanimity) qualities. To state this
negative result formally, say that an aggregation rule is minimally democratic
if x is judged socially preferred to y by the rule whenever all but at most
one individual strictly prefer x to y. Then the following is a straightforward
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consequence of Theorem 1.
For any minimally democratic aggregation rule, (a) the core is empty for
some preference profiles when d ‚ n ¡ 1 and (b) the core is empty for
almost all preference profiles when d ‚ 3.n ¡ 3/=2.
(Corollary 1 to Theorem 1)
From a modeling perspective, therefore, Corollary 1 tells us that any minimally
democratic aggregation rule (e.g. majority rule) possesses a serious shortcom-
ing as the basis for a general theory of politics, in that such a rule in principle
cannot explain collective decision making in certain environments while si-
multaneously allowing some modest amount of latitude in the specification of
individual preferences. Put another way, any explanatory theory of collective
choice in complex environments based on a model of direct preference ag-
gregation under minimal democracy must describe how individual preferences
consistently live along the razor’s edge of profiles that admit nonempty cores.
Now it is reasonable to consider the direct preference aggregation theory of
collective choice as a formal theory of political decision making in terms of
some notion of a “collective will,” where the latter is reflected in the desiderata
(including minimal democracy) defining the particular aggregation rule in use.
As such, Corollary 1 renders any such conception of political decision making
suspect (Riker, 1982)—when there is no core, the view that observed policy
choices embody a “collective will” seems hard to maintain, because for any
alternative there exists a policy that is socially preferable according to that
same “will.” And this inference is reinforced by the (somewhat unfortunately
termed) “chaos theorems.” Specifically, although we know that when a core
does not exist a social preference cycle must exist, as in the Condorcet paradox
above, McKelvey (1976, 1979) demonstrates further that in the spatial model
such cycles are essentially all-inclusive for aggregation methods like majority
rule. Thus his result implies that when social preference breaks down, in the
sense of not admitting a core alternative, it breaks down completely—social
preference cycles fill the space, and one can get from any alternative to any
other (and back again) via the social preference relation. In general, individual
preferences per se place almost no constraints on collective preference. [It is
perhaps worth emphasizing here that McKelvey’s theorem says nothing about
whether the core is empty; it concerns only the properties of social preferences
(not choices) given the core is empty. See also Schofield (1984).]
Some have interpreted McKelvey’s Theorem as predicting that anything can
happen in politics (Riker 1980), meaning that political behavior under mini-
mally democratic institutions (in the technical sense of the term used here) is
necessarily chaotic or unpredictable. We do not agree with this interpretation.
The theory, as exemplified by Corollary 1 above, does not predict that anything
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can happen—it does not predict anything at all, which is the fundamental prob-
lem in employing the theory as a positive model of politics. The chaos result of
McKelvey simply emphasizes the impossibility of any general theory of politi-
cal behavior based solely on the notion of preference aggregation under the con-
straint of minimal democracy and, from a normative perspective, implies that
any hope of finding substantive content in the idea of a “collective will” with re-
spect to policy choice is slender indeed. The “chaos” that McKelvey’s Theorem
addresses is not from our perspective an equilibrium phenomenon, as is found
for instance in various recent macroeconomic models (e.g. Grandmont 1985),
but rather demonstrates how badly any minimally democratic social preference
relation can behave. Hence attempts to render this an empirical prediction, and
then ask questions such as “Why so much stability?” (Tullock 1981) are moot.5
5. STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY
An alternative to the direct preference aggregation approach to understanding
political behavior, is the class of choice aggregation models. All such models
require a theory of how individuals make choices in collective decision-making
settings, and the most widely employed of these theories is noncooperative
game theory.
As before, we begin with a set of alternatives X and a list of individuals’
preferences, summarized by the profile R. But now it is necessary to specify
exactly what choices are available to individuals, to describe the outcome in
X resulting from any given list of possible choices, and to offer a theory of
how individuals’ preferences and choices are related. Formally, the primitives
of the model include, for each individual i in the polity N, a set of available
strategies Si, where a strategy is understood as a complete description of how an
individual behaves in every logically possible circumstance she might confront.
Analogous to a preference profile, we will label a specific list of strategies
s D .s1; : : : ; sn/, one for each individual, as a strategy profile, and we will let
S denote the set of all possible strategy profiles. For the second component, an
outcome function g specifies which alternative in X is chosen when a given list
of strategies is chosen by the individuals; that is, the function g takes elements
of S as input and gives elements of X as output, and so g.s/ is an element of the
5One possible escape route from this argument is to weaken the second mapping in Diagram 1;
that is, rather than look solely for maximal elements with respect to the social preference relation,
identify some other (with luck nonempty) set of alternatives. The two most well-traveled routes
with respect to majority rule are the top cycle set (Schwartz 1972) and the uncovered set (Miller
1980) (actually, one could equivalently treat this as modifying f to generate the transitive closure
relation and the covering relation, and then still use m). However, McKelvey’s Theorem shows
that the former is just about the entire set when the majority rule core is empty, thereby nullifying
any empirical content. The second option holds a higher promise; see McKelvey (1986).
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set X. Taken together, G D .S; g/ is known as a game form. Adding the list of
individuals’ preferences to the game form G yields the game .G; R/.
Although the idea of a game form is somewhat abstract, a natural interpre-
tation within political science is that game forms are succinct descriptions of
institutions: Strategy sets define the choices available to individuals under the
rules of the institution, and outcome functions specify the collective decisions
consequent on any list of such choices. Examples include various electoral
procedures (e.g. plurality rule vs proportional representation), voting proce-
dures (e.g. amendment agendas vs successive, open vs closed rules), committee
systems, executive vetoes, and the like that have been the focus of much of the
formal analysis in the recent past. Indeed, to the extent that these elements are
readily observable, game-theoretic models permit a test of both outcomes and
behavior. Furthermore, they allow the analyst to compare and make judgments
about different institutions with respect to both the behavior they induce and
the outcomes they generate.
Note that an individual’s preferences over the set of outcomes X, together
with the outcome function g, induce preferences for her over the set of strategy
profiles S by equating a strategy profile with the outcome it ultimately produces.
That is, a strategy profile s is judged to be at least as good as another s0 if the
outcome associated with s, namely g.s/, is at least as good as that associated
with s0, g.s 0/. This allows for a more concise description of a game as simply
the available strategy sets, (S1; : : : ; Sn), together with the individuals’ induced
preferences over S; this is what is known as a game in normal form. We wish to
maintain the “spatial” structure on the decision problem as before, so assume
each Si is a closed, bounded, and convex subset of di -dimensional Euclidean
space, and that an individual’s induced preferences on S satisfy the “4 Cs,”
above. (Note that these implicitly place continuity and convexity assumptions
on the admissible set of outcome functions. Also, as before, these assumptions
are somewhat stronger than necessary.)
Finally it remains to specify how individuals select strategies, where such
a selection can be predicated on the specifics of the game form. If one were
to fix the strategy choices for all individuals other than, say, individual i, then
i’s problem of finding an optimal or preference-maximizing strategy is well
posed; in particular, for any list of others’ strategies there would exist a uniquely
optimal strategy for i. For a certain class of games this optimal strategy for
i is actually independent of the others’ strategies, and so constitutes (in game
theory parlance) a dominant strategy. The most well-known example of such
a game is the prisoners’ dilemma. For games in which each individual has a
dominant strategy there is then a straightforward theoretical prediction, namely
that each will adopt her dominant strategy.
For many games, however, dominant strategies do not exist. Consequently,
any individual’s optimal strategy will depend nontrivially on the choices made
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by others, so we need a richer behavioral theory for describing how individuals
within a game choose their respective strategies. The fundamental concept
describing strategy choices under such circumstances is Nash equilibrium. In
a Nash equilibrium each individual’s chosen strategy constitutes her optimal
strategy, given the strategy choices of all the other individuals. Thus a Nash
equilibrium is a profile of strategies s⁄ D .s⁄i ; : : : ; s⁄n / with the feature that no
individual i in N can unilaterally change her strategy to something else, say
s 0i , and generate a strictly better outcome. Largely for this reason, any list of
Nash equilibrium strategies is self-enforcing: if s⁄ is a list of Nash equilibrium
strategies, then no individual i has any incentive to do anything other than use
the prescribed strategy s⁄i when all others are likewise using their respective
strategies under s⁄.
For any game form G and behavioral theory h (e.g. dominant strategy or
Nash), we can compose the mappings h and g to identify the set of equilibrium
outcomes, i.e. those outcomes x in X such that x D g.s/, where s is an
equilibrium strategy profile at R according to the theory h. This composition
then generates a particular social choice correspondence in much the same way
that a preference aggregation rule generated a social choice correspondence
via the core. Notice however that, in contrast to the collective preference
approach, the influence of individual preferences on collective outcomes is
occurring more indirectly, through the individuals’ strategic choices under the
constraints imposed by the game form. Thus we can think of the collective
choices as being codetermined by the individuals’ preferences and the specifics
of the game form, and so any test of a game-theoretic model is a joint test of
the behavioral theory embodied in the equilibrium concept and the institutional
assumptions defining the game form. (Similarly, any test of a direct preference
aggregation model is a joint test of the rule f and the presumption that choices
reflect core outcomes under f.)
Letting h denote any arbitrary behavioral theory (mapping preference profiles
into strategy profiles), we have a diagram analogous to that for direct preference
aggregation (Diagram 2):
R h¡! S g¡! X: (Diagram 2)
Our next result shows that well-defined equilibrium outcomes for normal
form games are the rule rather than the exception (Nash 1950, Debreu 1952).6
Any normal form game satisfying the above assumptions has a Nash
equilibrium. (Theorem 3)
6Theorem 3 can be used to prove existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games with
finite strategy sets.
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. P
ol
it.
 S
ci
. 1
99
8.
1:
25
9-
28
7.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 ar
jou
rna
ls.
an
nu
alr
ev
iew
s.o
rg
by
 C
A
LI
FO
RN
IA
 IN
ST
IT
U
TE
 O
F 
TE
CH
N
O
LO
G
Y
 o
n 
09
/0
8/
05
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
          
P1: PSA/ary P2: rpk/plb QC: rpk
April 9, 1998 12:25 Annual Reviews AR073-1
274 AUSTEN-SMITH & BANKS
Indeed, the main problem with most game-theoretic analyses is not that Nash
equilibria fail to exist for any profile R but rather that there are too many of
them. In this respect the concept of a Nash equilibrium is too weak; it places
few restrictions on what outcomes might be observed. For example, consider
a plurality voting game in which any individual’s strategy is a vote choice for
one of a large finite set of alternatives, and the outcome function selects the
alternative that receives the largest total of votes. In this game any outcome
can be supported as a Nash equilibrium outcome, irrespective of individuals’
preferences, when there are at least three individuals; if everyone votes the same
way at every stage, then, under plurality rule, no single individual can change
the outcome by switching her voting strategy and so each may as well vote
with the crowd. This silly prediction is ruled out by the additional requirement
on the choice of equilibrium strategies that they be “perfect.” “Perfection” is one
example of an equilibrium refinement. Over the past 20 years or so a literature on
equilibrium refinements has developed in which further assumptions are made
on how individuals select strategies, thereby imposing further constraints on
predictions generated by any model using these assumptions. Since the issues
here, although important, are quite technical we do not pursue them further;
the interested reader can consult, for example, Morrow (1994) or Fudenberg &
Tirole (1993).
Returning to the notion of political institutions as game forms, suppose we
have a set of possible institutions, G (with common elements G D .S; g/,
G 0 D .S0; g0/, etc), and suppose for ease of exposition that associated with each
game form is a unique equilibrium, and hence (through the outcome function
g) a unique element of the outcome set X. Then it is meaningful to compare
institutions via the equilibrium outcomes that they support (Myerson 1995,
1996). Such an approach has generated a rich set of empirical predictions
regarding how institutional constraints influence political behavior and out-
comes (e.g. Huber 1996, Krehbiel 1991). In addition, by focusing solely on the
equilibrium outcomes, this method also provides a foundation for normative
arguments regarding institutional choice (Austen-Smith & Banks 1988, Cox
1990, Myerson 1993, Diermeier & Myerson 1995, Diermeier & Feddersen
1996, Persson et al 1996).7
All of this is predicated to an extent on the existence result found in
Theorem 3, namely that, regardless of the heterogeneity in individuals’ prefer-
ences, a Nash equilibrium (or a refinement) will exist for a wide class of games.
But the Nash equilibrium outcome correspondence is “just” another example
7A different perspective on games and institutions is provided by Calvert (1995). He argues that
social institutions are appropriately viewed as equilibria of a loosely specified game played over
time, rather than as game forms per se. This approach seems particularly useful for developing a
theory of institutional evolution and stability.
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of a social choice correspondence as defined in Section 3, and hence the neg-
ative implications of Theorem 1 must hold true for the game theory approach
to politics as they do for the collective preference approach. In fact, Theorem
1 has an immediate implication for game theory, analogous to Corollary 1 for
collective preference.
Let G be any game form such that, for all profiles R in R, the set of
equilibrium outcomes is non-empty. (a) If d ‚ n ¡ 1 then there exists a
preference profile and alternatives x and y in X such that x is an equili-
brium outcome and y is strictly preferred to x by at least n¡1 individuals.
(b) If d ‚ 3.n¡ 3/=2 then statement (a) is true for almost all preference
profiles. (Corollary 2 to Theorem 1)
(Note that as stated Corollary 2 holds for any behavioral theory, not just Nash.)
For sufficiently complex problems, therefore, game-theoretic models of indi-
rect preference aggregation avoid the implications of Theorem 1 only by giving
at least one individual some veto power, or dictatorial control, over at least one
collective decision. Less prosaically, any appearance that Theorem 3 avoids
the consequences of Theorem 1 is illusory; if surrendering minimal democracy
is deemed acceptable to obtain equilibrium existence in game-theoretic mod-
els, then it is acceptable to give up the condition to obtain core existence in
social choice models. And as Diagram 3 (we hope) makes clear, the collective
preference approach and game theory approach should be considered two sides
of the same coin, two complementary methods for generating social choice
correspondences. [Diagram 3 is a minor variation on the familiar Mount-Reiter
diagram in economic theory (Reiter 1977).]
f
B
m
R Xc
S
g
¡!
ˆ¡
ˆ¡ˆ¡
ˆ¡
h
¡ Diagram 3)(
Corollary 1 and Theorem 3 differ not so much in their respective existence
claims as in their relative adherence to the minimal democracy condition, sug-
gesting that to insist on this condition a priori is unproductive for development
of a positive political theory. Any selection of game theory over collective pre-
ference as a method of political analysis, therefore, cannot be predicated on the
issue of existence, but must depend on the problem of concern. For example, it
is sensible to use game theory to understand the behavioral incentives induced
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by, and the strategic properties of, various political institutions (e.g. voting with
amendment agendas). On the other hand, collective preference theory is better
suited for normative analysis of such properties and for decision problems with
little or obscure detailed institutional structure (e.g. open rules in Congress).
6. MORE CONNECTIONS
The preceding argument centered on whether preference-based models invari-
ably provide a prediction, and it tapped the common underlying properties of
the collective preference and game theory approaches to politics. In certain
circumstances the two approaches are observationally equivalent, in the sense
that the predictions of the collective preference approach and the game theory
approach coincide.
Suppose we have a social choice correspondence c that is nonempty for all R
inR, and recall from Theorem 2 that the majority rule core is such a mapping
when the outcome space X is one-dimensional. Say that a game form (S; g)
implements c in dominant strategies if for all R inR, each i in N has a dominant
strategy in Si, and the set of outcomes supported by such strategies is the same
as the set of outcomes selected by c. In such an instance we can think of the
game form (S; g) as performing indirectly the operation that c performs directly
on preferences. We then have the following (Moulin 1980):
When d D 1 there exists a game form which implements the majority rule
core in dominant strategies. (Theorem 4)
As a simple example of such a game form, let Si D X for all i in N, with
the outcome function g then being the selection of the median of the chosen
alternatives. Then each player has a dominant strategy to choose her ideal point,
since choosing any other alternative can only move the median away from her
ideal point (and by convex preferences she prefers alternatives closer to her
ideal point).8
Thus we can think of the median voter theorem as either an exercise in
direct preference aggregation as in Section 4, or as the equilibrium outcome
associated with a specific game form as in Section 5. In other words, the median
8Alternatively, consider the following (intuitively described) game: there is a given status quo
policy, q, and each individual proposes an alternative to q, say pi, as the collective choice. Once
all individuals have made a proposal, the collective decision is made from the set fp1; : : : ; pn; qg
according to the “amendment” procedure that first determines the majority vote between p1 and p2,
then puts the winner against p3, etc, until eventually the collective choice is given by the majority
winner in a contest between the surviving proposal and the status quo q. Given the assumptions (X
one-dimensional, etc) it turns out that the unique (perfect) Nash equilibrium outcome to this game
is the median voter’s most preferred outcome.
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voter theorem has a non-cooperative strategic foundation. From an empirical
perspective it does not matter which model one adopts, because as constructed
the models arrive at the same predicted outcome.
Theorem 4 starts with the core concept, namely majority rule, and then shows
the existence of a game form for which the outcomes of the two coincide when
the outcome space is one-dimensional. For a class of game forms it is possible
to go in the other direction as well; that is, for a given game form one can find a
preference aggregation rule such that the core of this rule and the Nash equilibria
of the game form coincide. Say that the outcome function g is one-to-one if
g.s/ is different from g.s 0/ whenever s is different from s 0.
If the game form .S; g/ is such that g is one-to-one, then there exists a
monotonic preference aggregation rule f such that for allR in R the core
outcomes under f are equivalent to the Nash equilibrium outcomes under
.S; g/.9 (Theorem 5)
(A proof for this theorem is given in Section 9.) Thus, when the outcome func-
tion is one-to-one, the distinction between the collective preference approach
and game theory approach is again attenuated, in that one could have just as
readily taken the former approach while employing a particular monotonic ag-
gregation rule (the first model of the next section provides an example of a
game form with such an outcome function). If d ‚ n ¡ 1 and the game form
G is such that Nash equilibria exist for all preference profiles in R, then we
know something more about this associated aggregation rule, namely that this
rule must fail to satisfy the criterion of minimal democracy (by Corollary 1).
7. EXAMPLES FROM LEGISLATIVE POLITICS
This section reviews four theoretical models drawn from the literature on leg-
islative politics to illustrate some of the issues we have raised. The first two
models have as their environment the basic multidimensional structure found
in Section 2; the third is a one-dimensional model with the added twist of in-
complete information; and the fourth is a distributional problem. The first three
employ observed institutional structures as the foundation for their models,
whereas in the fourth no such observable structure exists.
9Even if g is not one-to-one in a game form G, it is always possible to construct a preference
aggregation fG for which the core coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes. For any
game .G; R/ and any x,y such that x is, and y is not, a member of the equilibrium set of outcomes,
let fG rank xPs y, and for any other pair of alternatives, let fG rank xIs y. This rule violates
both monotonicity (as defined in the text) and the weaker Arrovian condition of Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives.
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7.1 Ministers and Policy Portfolios
Laver & Shepsle (1990) and Austen-Smith & Banks (1990) model govern-
mental decision making in parliamentary democracies as being predicated on
a decomposition of complex, multidimensional choice problems into a family
of smaller, “dictatorial” choice problems. Each issue of the policy space is
associated with exactly one cabinet minister, who has complete control over
the outcome along this dimension. A minister is allowed to hold multiple issues
or “portfolios,” and so we define an issue allocation as an assignment of the
set of policy issues to individuals such that every issue is assigned to some
individual and no issue is assigned to more than one individual. Assuming
for convenience that the set of outcomes X is “rectangular” or separable and
so is itself decomposable, any issue allocation generates a well-defined game
among the ministers, i.e. those individual legislators holding portfolios. [Banks
& Duggan (1997) show how to get around this “rectangular” assumption.] For
example, if X is the unit square, and the issue allocation assigns dimension 1 to
the first individual and dimension 2 to the second, i selects a point si in [0,1],
and the collective outcome is then simply (s1, s2). Given our earlier assump-
tions on individual preference, Theorem 3 guarantees the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for any issue allocation. By definition of an issue allocation and
the rules governing how issue-by-issue choices are made, the outcome func-
tion for the game form described here is one-to-one. So, by Theorem 5, any
equilibrium outcome in the portfolio allocation model is also a core alternative
for a naturally defined monotonic preference aggregation rule (see the proof in
Section 9 for a construction).
The location of the equilibrium outcomes will depend on the particular issue
allocation (among other factors), in that different allocations typically give rise
to different equilibrium outcomes. Thus we expect individuals in N to have
preferences over the allocations per se, in which case the structure-induced
explanation of particular policy decisions is in a sense incomplete. Austen-
Smith & Banks (1990) and Laver & Shepsle (1990) explore various concepts
of the core applied to issue allocations; given that policy outcomes are de-
termined by the relevant allocations, individuals’ induced preferences over
allocations can be derived, and we can look for cores with respect to these
induced preferences rather than the primitive ones. Since the set of possible
equilibrium outcomes under issue allocation models is much smaller than the
set of all outcomes, “allocation” cores can exist more often than in the direct
preference aggregation models. Further, allocation cores then yield predic-
tions on both the distribution of decision-making responsibility in a legisla-
ture and the policy outcomes supported by such allocations. In particular, for
some distributions of preferences the model predicts minority coalition govern-
ments. [Laver & Shepsle (1996) take these and other predictions to the data on
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post–World War II coalitional governments in parliamentary systems with some
degree of success.]
The use of the core here to study the choice of issue allocation among legis-
lators is largely to avoid modeling the specifics of government formation. That
is, we presume that in this instance the core adequately captures the possible
outcomes from a variety of conceivable game forms describing legislative bar-
gaining over policy responsibilities. An alternate approach is to model this
government formation process explicitly (e.g. Austen-Smith & Banks 1988,
Baron 1991).
7.2 Committees
The motivation for the preceding structural approach to legislative decision
making comes from Shepsle’s (1979) model of decision making in the US
Congress. Although the principal formal result is anticipated by Black &
Newing (1951) and Kramer (1972), Shepsle (1979) was the first to provide
a rigorous model of policy choice via legislative committees. Shepsle’s in-
sight was that a committee system, such as that in the US Congress, es-
sentially decomposes a complex high-dimensional choice problem into a se-
quence of simpler low-dimensional problems. At this point, something akin to
Theorem 2 can be invoked for within-committee decision making; the overall
outcome is then (as in the model of Section 7.1) the cumulation of committee
decisions.
A simple committee system is an institutional arrangement whereby, for each
of the d issue dimensions, there is a unique committee, or subset of legislators,
responsible for determining the collective choice on the dimension. A com-
mittee allocation is then an assignment of the set of individuals (in this case,
legislators) into the d committees such that (a) no committee is empty, and (b)
no individual is on more than one committee. For simplicity, assume again that
the policy set X is separable, and that there are an odd number of individuals in
each committee. Now suppose that each committee plays “Nash” against the
others, taking the decisions on the other issues as given, and uses the majority
method of preference aggregation to make its own decision. An equlibrium out-
come, say x⁄ D .x⁄1 ; : : : ; x⁄d /, is an element of X such that for each dimension
j, x⁄j constitutes the ideal outcome along dimension j for the median mem-
ber of the j th committee given the choices fx⁄i g of all committees i other than
j. Shepsle (1979) shows that an equilibrium outcome exists for any commit-
tee allocation in a simple committee system, thereby providing an institution-
ally predicated explanation for legislative policy choices in multidimensional
spaces.
Although we used the term “Nash” in the above description, Shepsle’s analy-
sis is not strictly speaking game-theoretic in the sense of Section 4; individuals
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do not have strategy sets, Nash equilibria are not identified, etc. As such, his
equilibria might be better understood as an example of core outcomes with
respect to a particular aggregation rule (Diermeier 1997). On the other hand,
since Shepsle’s model employs Theorem 2 and the median voter theorem, it
appears possible to invoke a result along the lines of Theorem 4 and provide
an explicit non-cooperative foundation for the equilibria his model generates.
Indeed, when individual preferences are separable across the d dimensions or
issues (i.e. an individual’s most preferred alternative on any one dimension is
independent of choices on other dimensions), one can use exactly the game form
following Theorem 4 to implement Shepsle’s equilibria in dominant strategies.
When individual preferences are not separable such dominant strategy imple-
mentation will not occur (Zhou 1991). However, any equilibrium in Shepsle’s
sense is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the aforementioned game, an equilib-
rium in which each individual again selects her ideal point (but now this point
depends on the choices of others). Therefore it is possible that this (or some
other) game form implements Shepsle’s equilibria in Nash equilibrium (as op-
posed to dominant strategies).10 The existence of such a game form would
then provide an explicit non-cooperative foundation for Shepsle’s equilibria,
thereby eliminating the distinction between a model of the social choice sort
or the game theory sort; as with the median voter theorem, we can think of the
model as both, and hence as either.
7.3 Open and Closed Rules
The committee system analyzed above rationalizes the use of such structures, in
particular the deference paid to a select subset of individuals on certain issues,
in terms of their equilibrium-generating properties. An alternative explanation
for this type of deference centers on specialization and information. In fact,
in the game-theoretic model of Gilligan & Krehbiel (1987) such deference
cannot be explained as in Shepsle (1979), for in their model the outcome space
has but a single dimension. Rather, this deference comes about as a rational
response to a presumed informational advantage held by the committee. [The
game Gilligan & Krehbiel analyze is one of incomplete information and so
technically falls outside the bounds of those discussed in Section 5. However,
Harsanyi (1967–1968) shows how to extend the concepts of normal form games
and Nash equilibrium to such environments (i.e. Bayesian games and Bayesian
Nash equilibrium). We do not worry about such matters here; the interested
reader should consult Fudenberg & Tirole (1993).]
10The remaining issue here concerns whether there exist other Nash equilibria to the game being
used to implement Shepsle’s equilibrium set of outcomes. That is, Shepsle’s equilibria may form
a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes on the (implementing) game, whereas Nash
implementation requires these sets to coincide.
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As mentioned, let the set of outcomes X be one-dimensional, and let a com-
mittee of individuals exist whose purpose is to propose an alternative to the
current status quo policy. Here we wish to distinguish between policies and
outcomes, so as before let x denote a typical outcome in X and let p denote a
typical proposal or bill. Assume bills are also one-dimensional objects, and
that the link between bills and outcomes is simply x D p C t, where the pa-
rameter t is some number between zero and one. The motivating assumption of
the model is that t is known to the committee members but unknown to every-
one else. Thus if the policy p is adopted, then the actual outcome is given by
x D p C t and this consequence is known surely only to the committee.
Both the committee and the remaining individuals in the legislature are mod-
eled as single actors, so let C denote the former and F (for “floor”) denote the
latter; the theoretical legitimacy of such a modeling choice is discussed below.
Two procedures are employed to determine a final policy, thereby yielding two
different game forms. Under a closed rule, C is permitted to make a take-it-
or-leave-it proposal; if this proposal is rejected by F, the status quo policy po
remains in effect. In contrast, under an open rule, C makes a proposal but now
F can select any policy it wants; F is not restricted to choosing between C’s
proposal and the status quo. Thus under the open rule C’s proposal has no sub-
stantive content, in that it will not directly affect F’s chosen policy. However,
C’s proposal may have informational content, because C can make its proposal
dependent on, or a function of, the true value of the parameter t. In particular, if
F speculates that C is offering different proposals for different values of t, then
upon observing one of these proposals F can make a better inference about what
the value of t is (that is, better than F’s prior belief). Under the closed rule, on the
other hand, C’s proposal can have both substantive and informational content.
Specific functional forms are assumed for C’s and F’s preferences, as well
as a uniform prior belief concerning t for F. Even with these niceties, however,
multiple equilibria exist under either procedure, so Gilligan & Krehbiel are
forced to make certain selections from the set of equilibria. Given these, they
are able to show that, for certain values of the parameters, F actually has a
preference (in terms of its ex ante expected payoff) for the closed rule over the
open, even though the closed rule allows C to bend outcomes in its preferred
direction due to the monopoly on the agenda C commands under this rule.
The logic of this result follows from the fact that at times the loss to F from
surrendering some control over the agenda is outweighed by an informational
gain. That is, when the committee is assured some distributional gain under the
closed rule, the proposals it offers signal more information regarding t to the
floor. Since the floor is assumed risk-averse, therefore, the more information
it has about the consequences of legislation, the better off it becomes. Note
that this induced preference for the closed rule over the open rule would never
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occur under complete information, because then the floor can always do better
by maintaining greater control over the final policy. Hence, informational
asymmetries are seen as an alternative explanation for the existence of deference
to committees, here in the form of closed rules.
Although perhaps not immediately apparent, the legitimacy of treating the
committee and the floor as unitary actors rests largely on Black’s median voter
theorem. That is, because of the assumption of one-dimensional outcome and
bill spaces, the presumed relationship connecting bills to outcomes preserves
single-peakedness of preference profiles. Consequently, under majority rule
within the committee and the legislature as a whole, it is legitimate to identify
the committee and the floor with their respective medians. Without these as-
sumptions it is unclear what occurs under open rule given a proposal or even
what proposals are offered, and therefore what the relevant welfare compa-
risons across rules are. One way to see this is to imagine the same set-up
as above except that the issue space is two-dimensional rather than one, and
that we break the floor into its constituent parts (i.e. a set of individuals with
well-defined preferences over X ). Then under the open rule it is not clear what
would happen once a proposal has been made by the committee, or rather, a
well-defined game form remains to be posited. Similarly, it is not immediately
obvious under either rule how to model the formation of a committee proposal.
Such troublesome issues are conveniently sidestepped in Gilligan & Krehbiel
by the assumption of a one-dimensional policy space, a policy space with (as
Theorem 2 notes) a majority rule core.
7.4 Bargaining
Finally we consider a pure distributional problem. A single dollar is to be
divided among n individuals (let X denote the set of all such divisions), where
each individual possesses “selfish” preferences in the sense of only caring about
her own amount. Baron & Ferejohn (1989) model the determination of an el-
ement in X as occurring through the following dynamic bargaining game: In
period 1 an individual is randomly selected from N, and makes a proposal x1
in X, after which all individuals vote to accept or reject x1. If x1 is accepted
by a majority of voters, the game ends with x1 as the outcome; otherwise the
game moves to period 2, in which an individual is randomly selected to offer
a proposal x2 in X, and so on. The process continues until a proposal is ac-
cepted. In each period individuals are equally likely to be selected proposer,
and individuals are impatient and share a common discount factor –, 0 < –
< 1, so that if the t th proposal, x t, is accepted individual i’s payoff is worth
simply –t¡1xti as evaluated at the start of the game. The central institutional fea-
ture of the Baron & Ferejohn model, sequential bargaining, has subsequently
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. P
ol
it.
 S
ci
. 1
99
8.
1:
25
9-
28
7.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 ar
jou
rna
ls.
an
nu
alr
ev
iew
s.o
rg
by
 C
A
LI
FO
RN
IA
 IN
ST
IT
U
TE
 O
F 
TE
CH
N
O
LO
G
Y
 o
n 
09
/0
8/
05
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
         
P1: PSA/ary P2: rpk/plb QC: rpk
April 9, 1998 12:25 Annual Reviews AR073-1
POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 283
been applied to a wide variation of problems; see for example Baron (1994)
or Diermeier & Feddersen (1996). Alternative non-cooperative models with
distributional and policy dimensions include Groseclose & Snyder (1996) and
Snyder (1990). Note that the actual outcome space is X together with f1, 2, : : :g,
with the latter representing the time at which a proposal is accepted.
There are many Nash equilibria to this game. Baron & Ferejohn focus on a
particularly simple class of equilibria, perfect stationary (essentially, history-
independent) equilibria, which they show to exist and have the following qua-
litative properties: When an individual is selected, she proposes a split of the
dollar in which she keeps the lion’s share, .n¡1/=2 others receive equal smaller
shares, and the remaining .n ¡ 1/=2 individuals receive nothing; this proposal
is then accepted by the individuals receiving a positive amount. Therefore the
very first proposal is accepted, avoiding any (costly) delay, and ex post (after the
fact) only a bare majority of individuals receive positive amounts—although
which majority is uncertain ex ante (before the fact).
The purely distributive politics game is the least tractable from a direct
preference-aggregation approach. Since any distributional problem has di-
mensionality d D n ¡ 1 when there are n individuals (once n ¡ 1 shares are
determined, the nth share is given by the residual) and since preferences are
selfish, the core is surely empty under any minimally democratic preference-
aggregation rule and so offers no prediction. In contrast the Baron & Ferejohn
sequential bargaining model supports a well-defined prediction that only mini-
mal majorities will garner positive amounts of the dollar. At the same time, for
any equilibrium allocation x⁄ there is a distinct allocation x 0 that n ¡ 1 indi-
viduals strictly prefer to x⁄. Consequently, as Section 5 argues more generally
must be the case, equilibrium collective choice through the Baron & Ferejohn
bargaining process prima facie violates minimal democracy.
As we have already observed, empirical observation provides little struc-
ture that points to the “right” game form for modeling multilateral bargaining
processes. Given this, analysts lean toward specifying the most parsimonious
strategic model capable of supporting equilibria. Any judgment of the value
of such a model then rests on the extent to which the equilibrium predictions
yield empirical and conceptual insight regarding the forces at work. On the
other hand, there is the question of why we might expect legislators to adopt
stationary strategies. The importance of the “perfect stationary” equilibrium
refinement lies in the fact that, as Baron & Ferejohn demonstrated, if legisla-
tors are sufficiently patient their model is subject to a folk theorem under which
any allocation of the dollar can be supported as a perfect (albeit not station-
ary) Nash equilibrium. Therefore, although no minimally democratic direct
preference aggregation model can make a prediction (and none, as we keep
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insisting, predicts that anything can happen), the presence of a folk theorem
in the absence of stationarity really does say that anything can happen in the
Baron & Ferejohn bargaining model.
8. CONCLUSION
This brief essay makes no claim to be a general survey of positive political theory
as a whole. Rather, we articulate some connections between the two main ap-
proaches to rational actor model-building in political science: direct preference
aggregation (social choice theory) and indirect preference aggregation through
the aggregation of choices in strategic settings (non-cooperative game theory).
In so doing, we implicitly argue that the historical shift away from direct prefer-
ence aggregation models toward institutionally more explicit strategic models
of collective choice cannot reflect any methodological discontinuity.
Our main argument is that an apparently decisive difference between the
two approaches—that in sufficiently complex environments direct preference
aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas
non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictions—
is indeed only an apparent difference. The distinction between the two sorts
of model in this regard turns out to hinge critically on the extent to which a
property of minimal democracy is required. If we insist that all choices must
be minimally democratic (i.e. if at least all but one member of the polity
strictly prefers an alternative x to another y, then y should not be chosen when
x is available), then no game-theoretic model incorporating the requirement
is any likelier to yield a prediction than any similarly constrained collective
preference model. On the other hand, if we wish our collective choice models,
whether direct preference aggregation or game-theoretic, to yield predictions in
all environments, then necessarily the models must violate minimal democracy.
Equivalently, if we wish our collective choice models to yield predictions and
satisfy minimal democracy, then necessarily the environment must be kept
relatively simple (i.e. low-dimensional).
9. A PROOF FOR THEOREM 5
Let G D (S; g) and let ImfGg D g.S/ be the image of S under g. Define f by:
(a) if x 2 ImfGg and y 62 ImfGg, then x Ps y for all R; and (b) if x, y 62 ImfGg,
then x Is y for all R. For x; y 2 ImfGg , say that x and y are comparable if there
exists i 2 N, si ; s 0i 2 Si, s¡i 2 S¡i such that x D g(si, s¡i) and y D g(si0, s¡i)
(where s¡i denotes the profile of all individuals’ strategies except for individual
i, etc). Since g is one-to-one, this individual is unique, so for comparable x; y
let i(x; y) denote this individual. For all non-comparable x; y 2 ImfGg, let x Is y
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for all R, and for all comparable x; y 2 ImfGg let x Rs y , x Ri.x;y/y. Then
Rs is a complete binary relation for all preference profiles R. To see that f is
monotonic, note that if x 2 ImfGg and y 62 ImfGg then x Ps y for all R, and hence
monotonicity holds here. If x; y 2 ImfGg and x Ps y, then it must be that x and y
are comparable and that x Pi.x;y/y. But then under any new profile R0 satisfying
the antecedent, we still must have x P 0i.x;y/y, and hence x socially preferred to y
remains true.
Fix a profile R arbitrarily. Let C denote the core of f at R and let E denote
the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of G at R.
(a) To see: C µ E . If x 2 C then x Rs y for all y 2 X, in which case it must
be that x 2 ImfGg, or x D g.s/ for some s 2 S. For any j 2 N and s 0j 2 Sj ,
z · g.s 0j ; s¡ j / is comparable to x, and so x 2 C implies x Rs z and hence x R j z.
But then s is a Nash equilibrium of G at R, and hence x 2 E .
(b) To see: E µ C. Let x D g.s/; then x Rs y for all y 62 ImfGg and all non-
comparable y. If in addition s is a Nash equilibrium, then for all comparable
y 2 ImfGg, x Ri.x;y/y, and thus x Rs y for these outcomes as well. Therefore
x Rs y for all y 2 X, and hence x 2 C.
Because the profile R was chosen arbitrarily, (a) and (b) together complete
the proof.
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